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Martin G. McGuinn Business
Chair Lecture
FIVE DECADES OF CORPORATION LAW: FROM
CONGLOMERATION TO EQUITY COMPENSATION
RICHARD A. BOOTH
I. INTRODUCTION
T is an honor to speak to you today as the first Martin G. McGuinn
Professor of Business Law. Before I launch into my short talk, I would
like to thank Marty McGuinn and his family for endowing this chair. It
means that Villanova Law School will become a magnet for students and
scholars of business law nationwide. I would also like to thank Dean Mark
Sargent and the faculty of the law school, who chose me for this chair over
some stiff competition. I am truly grateful to have my work recognized by
such an august group and for the vote of confidence implicit in my ap-
pointment to this position. I trust that I will be able to live up to it. Fi-
nally, I would like to thank my wife Christine and my sons Charlie and
Turner. Although it was not too difficult for me to decide that I wanted to
join this faculty, I could not have done so without their love and support.
My subject today is the recent history of corporation law from about
1950 to the present. Although the phrase "corporation law" may sound a
bit odd to many ears, the phrase corporate law is too generic. There are all
sorts of laws that apply to corporations. Corporation law, on the other
hand, is what might be called the "constitutional law of corporations." It is
the law that governs the internal affairs of corporations. Every state has its
own corporation law. The United States sports fifty-one varieties of corpo-
ration law-not including the territories-more flavors than Baskin Rob-
bins and almost as many varieties as Heinz. But because of historical
accident-indeed historic accident-it is the corporation law of Delaware
that applies to most publicly traded corporations.'
1. In 1875, New Jersey became the first state to adopt a general corporation
law that permitted any business to incorporate. By the 1890s, NewJersey had es-
tablished itself as the jurisdiction of choice for big business, in part because its law
permitted one corporation to own stock in another corporation and thus permit-
ted the formation of so-called "trusts." Such combinations of companies in turn
(459)
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When I started law school in 1973, corporation law was more or less
dead. As Dean Bayless Manning wrote in 1962:
[C]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the
United States. When American law ceased to take the corpora-
tion seriously, the entire body of law that had been built upon
that intellectual construct slowly perforated and rotted away. We
have nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes-tow-
ering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together
and containing nothing but wind ....
Those of us in academic life who have specialized in corporation law
face technological unemployment, or at least substantial retooling. There
is still a good bit of work to be done to persuade someone to give a decent
burial to the shivering skeletons. 2
I did not run across this passage until sometime after I had decided to
focus my own intellectual efforts in the area (even though my first law
school class on corporations was a pretty good indication that Manning
was correct). 3
II. THE 1970s
Although there are state law rules that govern the actions of directors
and officers, the courts before the mid-1970s seldom found any violation,
no matter how egregious the conduct. Many suspected Delaware of pan-
gave rise to antitrust laws. At the end of his tenure as governor of New Jersey, in
his farewell speech to the state legislature after he had been elected President in
1912, Woodrow Wilson (with a good deal of prodding from Louis Brandeis) pro-
posed a package of changes to the provisions of NewJersey corporation law that he
saw as most abusive. That proposal came to be known as the Seven Sisters because
it consisted of seven separate bills. Among other things, the bills forbade the for-
mation of holding companies. SeeJoseph F. Mahoney, Backsliding Convert: Woodrow
Wilson and the "Seven Sisters", 18 AM. Q. 71, 73 (1966) (detailing new corporate
regulations). These changes to New Jersey law were adopted in 1913. See id. But
Delaware had already copied New Jersey law, so most big New Jersey corporations
simply reincorporated in Delaware. Thus, Delaware became the jurisdiction of
choice for big business and has remained so ever since. See S. Samuel Arsht, A
History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1 (1976) (tracing formation
of Delaware corporate law).
2. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE LJ. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
3. In contrast, my second law school class on things corporate, Business Units
II (taught by Marvin Chirelstein), was the single most important factor that in-
spired me to specialize in corporation law. I have heard other Yalies who teach in
the area say the same. Although it now seems like a modest contribution to legal
scholarship, the article that Chirelstein published with Victor Brudney of Harvard
discussing how to allocate merger gains was groundbreaking. SeeVictor Brudney &
Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L.
REv. 297, 297 (1974) (arguing that "fair merger requires that gains generated by
the combination should be shared by the two corporations rather than wholly ab-
sorbed by either"). Incidentally, the odd title Business Units (or BU as we called it)
was a product of Legal Realism, reportedly coined by William 0. Douglas.
460 [Vol. 53: p. 459
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dering to managers and controlling stockholders who could easily move
the corporation's charter to another, more hospitable state if they became
dissatisfied. This prompted Professor William Cary, a former chairman of
the SEC, to publish a landmark 1974 law review article arguing that the
states were engaged in a race to the bottom-a competition in laxity-and
to propose a federal takeover of corporation law that would provide mean-
ingful fiduciary standards.
4
Short of a federal takeover, it was the hope of many reformers that
federal securities law could fill the gaps in state law. 5 Indeed, the SEC's
catch-all antifraud rule-Rule 10b-5-seemed nimble enough to deal with
most problems. Although federal securities law mandates disclosure to in-
vestors and does not create any fiduciary duties, it is easy in most cases to
cast a claim in terms of disclosure. A stockholder can always say that if
only she had known, she would have sold her stock or sued for an
injunction.
The showdown came over going private.6 With the stock market in
the doldrums from 1962 to 1982, many public corporations sought to buy
4. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 699-700 (1974) (calling for comprehensive federal standards, not
simply extension of Rule 10b-5). For example, Cary cited Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548 (Del. 1964), as a case in which the Supreme Court of Delaware permitted
incumbent management to use corporate assets to defend against the unwanted
advances of a would-be acquirer to the detriment of stockholder interests. See id. at
673-75 (discussing Delaware's "penchant in favor of management"). The race to
the bottom was not original to Cary. Wilson and Brandeis made similar arguments
sixty years earlier. The migration of NewJersey corporations to Delaware after the
enactment of the Seven Sisters seems to prove the point. Although the race to the
bottom sounds like a good explanation for the evolution of corporation law, sev-
eral legal scholars have argued that it makes no sense. Why would a corporation
want to incorporate in a jurisdiction distrusted by stockholders? That would tend
to depress stock price and expose the corporation to takeover. Rather, a corpora-
tion should choose to incorporate in a state stockholders favor. And stockholders
should favor a state with laws that afford stockholders rights where they matter
without creating opportunities for obstructionist stockholders. See, e.g., Daniel R.
Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Dela-
ware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913, 920-21 (1982) (critiquing "race to
the bottom" thesis).
5. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National Markets
in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1473 (1986) (discuss-
ing federalism principles); Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance,
45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545 (1984) [hereinafter Schwartz, Federalism] (urging creation of
federal chartering system); see also RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN,
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION: How THE LARGEST CORPORATIONS CONTROL OUR
LivEs (1976) (exploring federal chartering system); Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for
Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAw. 1125 (1976) (discussing thoughts on
what federal corporation law should provide); Donald E. Schwartz, Towards New
Corporate Goals: Co-Existence with Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57 (1971) (examining concept
of federal corporation law).
6. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd,
514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975) (denying appeal of injunction order against consum-
mation of tender offer where appellant challenged action as amounting to "going
private").
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back their own stock. In some cases they resorted to merger with a shell
corporation by which all of the public stockholders could be forced to take
cash for their shares. 7 It was like eminent domain for corporations. Never
mind that some stockholders might not want to sell. On the other hand,
why should going public be a one-way trip? And why should a corporation
be able only to get bigger through merger?8
Ironically, the worry in the 1960s was more about bigness than about
stockholder welfare. 9 Even the old soldier President Eisenhower had
warned that the military-industrial complex was a threat to democracy.
And the trendy subject in law school was antitrust. Looking back, it is odd
that it was not apparent at the time that going private signaled the possibil-
ity that investors and managers might like the idea of smaller, more fo-
cused companies. By the mid 1980s, antitrust was more or less dead and
the bust-up takeover was all the rage.
Nevertheless, critics argued that it was wrong for a controlling stock-
holder to buy back stock held by the public at bargain basement prices
using the corporation's money-let alone to force reluctant stockholders
to sell. Presumably, insiders would propose such a deal only if they be-
lieved that the stock was worth more than the market price. And presuma-
bly, they would keep the gain for themselves. Besides, why should an
investor be forced to give up a stock simply because insiders find it incon-
venient to have public stockholders?
7. Before the 1960s, a stockholder almost always got stock in the surviving
corporation. Although cash mergers were originally intended to afford flexibility
in mergers involving companies with complex capital structures, one unintended
consequence of permitting cash mergers was that they could be used to cash out
minority stockholders. The first real cash merger statute was adopted by New York
in 1936 to permit the cash-out of a minority interest where a parent utility owned
ninety-five percent or more of the stock of a subsidiary-a so-called short-form
merger. Delaware amended its general merger statute in 1967 to permit cash con-
sideration, but it was not until 1971 that the Delaware courts clearly permitted the
cash-out of minority stockholders other than in a transaction involving a short-
form merger where the surviving corporation owns at least ninety percent of the
stock of its merger partner. See DavidJ. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281
A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971) (finding merger of subsidiary and parent not grossly un-
fair where parent held eighty-six percent of subsidiary's common stock and value
of offer closely approximated price at which subsidiary's shares had traded on na-
tional stock exchange); Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The
Promise ofWeinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1 (1983) (exploring court's
efforts to balance interests of majority and minority shareholders in cash-out merg-
ers). In other words, cash-out mergers were a recent innovation in the 1970s.
8. Even today, few states have statutory procedures by which a corporation
may shrink itself.
9. Here, too, Brandeis was among the harshest critics of the way corporation
law had evolved. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) ("Through size, corporations, once merely an efficient tool
employed by individuals in the conduct of private business have become an institu-
tion-an institution which has brought such concentration of economic power
that so-called private corporations are sometimes able to dominate the state.").
[Vol. 53: p. 459
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To many observers, going private was yet another example of lax state
law standards. Their hope was that federal securities law would come to
the rescue.10 But in 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green'1 that Rule lOb-5 did not cover cash-out
mergers in the absence of some kind of deception.' 2 Given that the cash-
out merger in that case did not even require a stockholder vote, there was
no need for any advance disclosure to the stockholders and no possibility
of deception. The good news for Delaware was that federal securities law
(as it stood) would not supplant state law fiduciary duty. The bad news was
that Congress could change the law and might be inclined to do so if the
cash merger or some other newfangled device was used to threaten an
established company. After all, Congress had rather quickly passed the
Williams Act in 1968, regulating the conduct of cash tender offers, after
one senator declared that: "[T] oday, there are those individuals who seek
to reduce our proudest business into nothing but corporate shells. They
seize control of the corporation with unknown sources, sell or trade away
the best assets, and later split up the remains among themselves." 13
It was six months (to the day) after the decision in Santa Fe that the
Delaware Supreme Court handed down its decision in Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 14 holding that there was a business purpose requirement for mergers.
Delaware had dodged the bullet of federal takeover by affording stock-
10. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons
from History, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1793, 1812 (2006) (stating that "for a brief period,
it seemed that federal courts would expand the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b-5
to include oppressive freeze [-]outs").
11. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
12. See id. at 476 (stating that "statute provides a cause of action for any plain-
tiff who suffers an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale or
purchase of securities") (internal quotations omitted).
13. 113 CONG. REc. 857 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel). Although the
original bill sought to discourage hostile bids, the Williams Act was more neutral,
focusing instead on disclosure and setting certain ground rules, both of which
measures were ostensibly designed to protect target stockholders, but both of
which also afforded the target company more time to defend itself. See Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1977) (discussing Williams Act); Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1974) (same). See generally Schwartz,
Federalism, supra note 5, at 564 (explaining that "statute purports to be neutral with
respect to tender offers, trying neither to discourage them, nor to tip the balance
in favor of one side or the other").
14. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). The court held that "a Delaware Court will not
be indifferent to the purpose of a merger when a freeze-out of minority stockhold-
ers on a cash-out basis is alleged to be its sole purpose." See id. at 979. What is
ironic is that if Singer had been on the books, presumably Santa Fe would have been
decided the other way. The clear implication was that federal securities law de-
pended on state law. Following Santa Fe, the federal courts looked to state law to
determine the contours of fiduciary duty not only for mergers, but also for insider
trading, takeover defenses and virtually every other issue that came before them
under federal securities law. That would give rise within a few years to the odd
spectacle of the SEC appearing in the Delaware courts to plead its case.
2008]
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holders new rights to challenge mergers.' 5 I do not claim here that Dela-
ware was motivated by the threat of federal legislation to change its law.
Indeed, Singer was a quite principled decision. But Singer was a mixed
blessing for Delaware. It meant that, in Delaware, a plaintiff could chal-
lenge a merger by incanting the mantra of "no business purpose." Every
merger was thus reviewable by the courts. 16 And the smallest investor
could potentially hold up a deal simply because he wanted to keep his
shares.
III. THE 1950s
Stockholders would soon see their new-found rights as more burden
than benefit. 17 To see why, we must go back in time to 1952 and the birth
of Modern Portfolio Theory-MPT for short. (I have always thought the
name a bit odd. I do not think there was any ancient portfolio theory.)
Harry Markowitz-who later won a Nobel Prize for his work-showed that
investors could reduce risk without any sacrifice of return by investing in a
diversified portfolio of stocks (or other securities).' 8 For investors, getting
the same return for less risk was like finding the Holy Grail.
It is not surprising that the MBAs of the 1950s figured they could
apply Markowitz's ideas at firm level to assemble a portfolio of companies.
It stood to reason that a conglomerate corporation composed of many
different individual businesses would be less risky as a whole than the sum
of its parts. When one division faltered, another would likely pick up the
slack. The earnings of the whole would be relatively stable even if there
was turmoil below. Stock price should rise and capital should be
15. This is not to say that the motivation for Singerwas overtly political. It was
a perfectly principled position for the Delaware courts to rule that a stockholder
could not be done out of his investment except for a valid business purpose. Al-
though the immediate threat to Delaware's supremacy had been averted, Santa Fe
was likely an important factor in prompting the American Law Institute to under-
take the Principles of Corporate Governance, which many in the practicing bar
also came to view as a threat in the late 1980s.
16. Moreover, if a merger was found wanting, the remedy was quite generous.
Rescissory damages gave the plaintiffs the value of what they would have had if the
merger had never occurred. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501
(Del. 1981) (ordering damages equal to value of stock at either time of resale or
judgment). And that encouraged even more litigation. In short, Singer was a no-
ble experiment, but it was ill-conceived and badly executed.
17. I am not aware of any event studies that seek to quantify market reaction
to either Singer or Weinberger, but I would guess that the market reacted negatively
to Singer and positively to Weinberger.
18. See Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952) ("Diversifi-
cation is both observed and sensible; a rule of behavior which does not imply the
superiority of diversification must be rejected both as a hypothesis and as a
maxim."). Markowitz taught at the business school at University of California, San
Diego at the time.
[Vol. 53: p. 459
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cheaper. 19 A conglomerate company with a high price-earnings (P/E) ra-
tio could absorb a business with a low P/E ratio and magically increase its
value. 20 In addition, the tax code made dividends unattractive for stock-
holders.2 1 So, what else was one to do with excess cash other than acquire
other companies? 22 And it did not hurt that most companies based CEO
19. SeeYakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for
Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELLJ. ECON. 605 (1981) (advancing and testing manage-
rial motive for conglomerate mergers).
20. For example, if a conglomerate with a P/E of 10 acquired a business with
a P/E of 5, the earnings of the acquired business when added to the earnings of
the conglomerate would add twice as much to the value of the conglomerate as
had been the value of the acquired company. In other words, the acquired com-
pany was worth twice its market value to the conglomerate. Or so the thinking
went. The gain depends, however, on an implicit market inefficiency, namely, that
the market is fooled into applying the P/E ratio of the conglomerate to the acqui-
sition even though the market had applied a lower P/E to the acquisition as a
stand alone company. As one might guess, analysts eventually figured out that they
could apply different discount rates to different lines of business. And the trick
stopped working. See generally BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL
STREET 61-68 (6th ed. 1996) (detailing conglomerate boom and eventual bust); see
also David Horowitz & Reese Ehrlich, Litton Industries: Big Brother as a Holding Com-
pany, in DAVID MERMELSTEIN, ECONOMICS: MAINSTREAM READINGS AND RADICAL CRI-
TIQUES 91, 95 (1970) (describing how "creating a glamour image [was] a major
preoccupation of conglomerate managements"). For an example of the more
fine-grained approach to valuation, see Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 7129,
1990 WL 161084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990).
21. Prior to 1984, individual income tax rates were almost confiscatory in the
upper brackets. Immediately before the 1986 tax act, the top individual rate was
fifty percent, and it had been as high as ninety percent before 1969, when it was
reduced to a mere seventy percent for the years up to 1981. The tax rate on capi-
tal gains, however, was only half that of the rate on ordinary income (and for a
time was only forty percent of the rate on ordinary income). One tax-motivated
tactic that evolved in the 1960s was for the owners of several separate corporations
to contribute their shares to a new corporation and take back shares in the new
corporation that would be roughly equivalent to a closed-end mutual fund. In-
deed, the resulting entity was often called a swap fund. Before 1967, such a deal
could be done tax free-without the recognition of gain at the time of the contri-
bution to the swap fund, even if the contributed shares were appreciated-under
IRC 351. See I.R.C. § 351 (West 2008). In 1966, Congress added Internal Revenue
Code section 351 (e) in order to treat such transactions as sales rather than tax-free
contributions to capital, somehow intuiting the gain that comes from diversifica-
tion. See Marvin A. Chirelstein, Tax Pooling and Tax Postponement-The Capital Ex-
change Funds, 75 YALE. L.J. 183, 214 (1965) (explaining "development of the capital
exchange fund as a device for the avoidance of federal tax on dispositions of ap-
preciated securities").
22. This is not to suggest that such acquisitions were usually or often made for
cash. To the contrary, most such deals were stock for stock deals because that deal
structure both permitted "pooling" accounting and eliminated the need for the
acquirer to depreciate goodwill after the acquisition. See Claire A. Hill, Why Finan-
cial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for "Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types
of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 161-63 (1997) (explaining account-
ing methods for business combinations). Nevertheless, extra cash was vital to con-
glomerate mergers because it gave the acquiring company the capacity to absorb
the target.
2008]
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incentive compensation on the growth of earnings or assets or both.23 Fi-
nally, it was more fun for management to run a bigger company. These
were the days of synergy and Bucky Fuller. The book Small Is Beautiful
would not be published until 1973.24
IV. THE 1980s
It is difficult to argue with the logic of conglomerate mergers in isola-
tion from alternative investments. But a conglomerate company is really a
glorified closed-end fund. Why would an investor choose such an invest-
ment over an open-end mutual fund? Closed-end funds can-and often
do-trade at a discount, whereas an open-end fund cannot. One answer
(among several) is that mutual funds were quite expensive in those days.
Sales loads were high-often eight percent or more. And the fund itself
paid full retail commission rates when it traded shares in its portfolio-
without even a volume discount-because brokerage commissions were
fixed by the New York Stock Exchange. All that began to change on May
Day 1974, with the abolition of fixed commissions for institutional inves-
tors. 25 In addition, the advent of IRAs in 1974 and 401(k) plans in 1982
(and the extension of IRAs in that same year) created a huge new market
for mutual funds.
As brokerage commissions fell, it became almost costless to assemble
a diversified portfolio of stocks or to change the mix at will. In contrast, it
was quite costly for a conglomerate to buy and sell whole companies. 26 In
other words, it is much cheaper for investors to diversify than it is for com-
panies to diversify. From the investor point of view, acquisitions aimed at
firm-level diversification (and other firm-level hedging strategies) are a
waste of money. (There is no reason to buy Lunchables if all you want is
cheese and crackers. Who needs the boloney?)
Moreover, there is no reason for a mutual fund to buy stock in a con-
glomerate. 27 So as mutual funds grew in size, demand for conglomerate
23. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. Special Term
1976) (acknowledging that directors' compensation may be keyed to profits).
24. See E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL Is BEAUTIFUL (1973) (advocating against the-
ory that "bigger is better"). While antitrust was the hot concentration among law
students in the mid 1970s, small business was the trendy career goal among busi-
ness students.
25. Fixed commission rates were abolished for individual investors on May 1,
1975.
26. A conservative estimate is that it costs five to seven percent of deal value
for one business to acquire another, whereas brokerage commissions today aver-
age about one cent per share for institutional investors or about 0.04% of a $25
stock.
27. This also explains why the SEC has resisted the "fund of funds" concept.
Although there may be some sense in diversifying one's holding of funds in order
to avoid the risk of bad fund management, there is not much else to be gained by
holding multiple funds with the same investment goals.
[Vol. 53: p. 459
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stocks fell. The net result was to set up a competition of sorts between
conglomerates and mutual funds.
Finally, in October 1979, the Federal Reserve Board-following the
advice of Milton Friedman-shifted its focus from interest rates to money
supply and permitted interest rates to float. Floating interest rates gave
rise to an active market for bonds.28 And that permitted Mike Milken and
Drexel Burnham to create a market for junk bonds.2 9 Soon, investors de-
veloped a taste for leverage. With leverage, a company can increase stock-
holder returns. Although leverage also increases risk, diversified investors
are indifferent to risk if it is justified by the prospect of higher returns. A
diversified investor does not much care if a few companies go broke if all
seek to maximize return. For every company that goes belly up, another
will perform better than expected. Only the average matters.3 0 So inves-
tors had another reason to reject conglomerates. Not only were they un-
necessary for investors who could achieve diversification more cheaply, but
a conglomerate is also a bad bet because the constituent companies have
no incentive to be focused.
In short, as mutual funds (and other institutional investors) gained
market share, demand for conglomerate stocks fell. As the market price
of conglomerate stocks fell, arbitrage set in. A bidder using cash from
junk bonds could buy a conglomerate, sell off the component companies
to pay back the loan, and exit the deal with a nice profit. It was a perfect
financial storm, and conglomerates were going down with the ship. In
effect, the market came to demand companies that were lean, mean and
focused.
31
28. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE
ON WALL STREET (1990) (describing author's personal experiences as bond sales-
man for Salomon Brothers during lucrative 1980s).
29. See generally CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL (1988).
30. This is somewhat at odds with the Modigliani & Miller thesis that (con-
trary to popular belief) leverage does not change the total value of a firm. See
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261, 261-71 (1958) (explaining how
capital structure is irrelevant to firm value). Modigliani and Merton's point is that
for a single firm, the value is the value no matter how one divides it up. The
addition of debt to the capital structure causes equity to become riskier and pre-
cisely offsets the potential benefits of leverage (other than tax benefits). But Modi-
gliani and Merton did not consider the effects of investor diversification (and
other hedging strategies), by which investors are able to avoid the downside of
leverage. See RonaldJ. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 231, 247-
51 (2008) (discussing real benefits of risk management).
31. See Haim Levy & Marshall Sarnat, Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the
Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers, 25 J. FIN. 795, 795 (1970) (arguing that "in a
perfect capital market an economic advantage cannot be achieved by a purely con-
glomerate merger"); Lance A. Nail et al., How Stock-Swap Mergers Affect Shareholder
(and Bondholder) Wealth: More Evidence of the Value of Corporate "Focus", I IJ. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 95 (1998) (finding inferior returns in conglomerate stock mergers for
period 1963-1996); Henri Servaes, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate
Merger Wave, 51J. FIN. 1201, 1201 (1996) (finding that conglomerates were valued
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Meanwhile, back in Delaware, Singer had become a liability. To be
sure, once a bidder gains control, the bidder can do what it wants with the
target. So it is not clear that minority stockholders must be cashed out.
But if minority stockholders cannot be cashed out, the bidder must share
its eventual gain (if any) with those that remain. And it is difficult to plan
a deal if you cannot predict the return. Moreover, if the target company
remains publicly traded-subject to complete control by the bidder
turned parent-target stock price is likely to be depressed. The bidder
may thus be precluded from securing financing or later offering target
shares to the public as a way of exiting the deal. The bottom line is lower
returns and fewer deals.
32
at discount even in 1960s); see also David J. Denis et al., Global Diversification, Indus-
trial Diversification and Firm Value (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.mgmt.pur-
due.edu/centers/ciber/publications/pdf/99-005.pdf (documenting increasing
trend in global diversification). Of course, there are always exceptions; in the case
of conglomerates, General Electric is a good example. See PATRICK GAUGHAN,
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 23 (3d ed. 2002).
32. Although an undiversified minority stockholder might argue that it is un-
desirable to encourage more deals anyway, a diversified stockholder would likely
favor a rule that maximizes the number of deals (and minimizes legal challenges
including appraisal rights) as long as a majority of the minority favors the deal. So,
it is no surprise that the majority vote required for mergers was gradually reduced
from the traditional two-thirds of both sets of stockholders to a majority of votes
cast by the target stockholders casting a vote. The problem is that if we permit
cash-out mergers, insiders can use the same technique to get rid of minority stock-
holders and take the company private. Although that may be a good deal for the
stockholders who get cashed out, it may also be tempting for insiders to run down
the price of the company to do the deal on the cheap. We could set up a rule that
prohibits insider mergers. But such a rule effectively presumes that all such merg-
ers are fraudulent and eliminates as buyers those who know the business best-a
classic case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
There are two possible answers to this conundrum. One is competition:
outside bidders are free to bid for the company and presumably will do so if the
proposed price is too low. The other is that minority stockholders can assert their
appraisal rights in such cases. Delaware adopted the former rule in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews &Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). The Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA) has adopted the latter rule. In essence, MBCA 13.02
confines appraisal to deals in which there is a danger of insider overreaching. Del-
aware has also taken the position that dissenting stockholders in an appraisal pro-
ceeding may be entitled to a control premium in addition to the appraised value of
their stock. See Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Ap-
praisal Proceedings, 57 Bus. LAw. 127, 128 (2001) (arguing that "the addition of a
control premium is inconsistent with settled corporation law and good policy that
there is no basis for the assumption that market prices routinely build in a minority
discount"). See generally Bradley R. Aronstam, R. Franklin Balotti & Timo Rehbock,
Delaware's Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in the
Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 Bus, LAw. 519, 522 (2003) (proposing
amendment of "appraisal statute to require parent corporations to pay all minority
shareholders, including those not exercising their appraisal right, the court's ap-
praised value if it exceeds what the corporation paid in the short-form merger").
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Mercifully, Singer was overruled in 1983 by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
which did away with the business purpose requirement. 3-3 In effect, Wein-
berger granted a license to cash out minority stockholders at a fair price. 34
It is no coincidence that the takeover market exploded following Wein-
berger, or that stockholders enjoyed unprecedented returns for the next
seventeen years.
35
V. THE 1990s
Weinberger was not the end of the matter. As one might guess, the
CEOs of potential target companies went looking for ways to defend them-
selves against the bust-up takeover.36 It is easy to see how a corporate
raider can make money from a bust-up takeover. Imagine buying an old
book filled with fifty original photographs for $1,000 and selling off the
framed individual prints for $100 each. Better still, recall the scene in the
movie Wall Street in which Gordon Gekko's legal henchmen describe how
they plan to sell off the pieces of Blue Star Airlines in order to pay back
the banks, much to the dismay of Bud.
In theory, a conglomerate could break up on its own initiative by spin-
ning off less profitable divisions to its own stockholders, who then would
enjoy the gain. And it has become common practice to do so-sometimes
to avoid takeover. In contrast, a hostile bidder has little choice but to sell
off assets. No one would buy a company in order to give away the pieces.
33. 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (holding that business purpose require-
ment "shall no longer be of any force or effect"). The trial court ruled in one
opinion that the goal of making a profit constituted a business purpose. No one
would propose such a deal but for the prospect of making a profit. So, one could
argue that the business purpose rule had been gutted because by definition, every
deal has a business purpose. On the other hand, and in fairness to the Weinberger
trial court, the business purpose might inhere in the fact that minority stockhold-
ers entail costs and expenses that can be avoided by cash-out. In other words, the
prospect of profit comes not from commandeering the portion of the profit that
would otherwise go to the minority, but rather by the prospect of an increase in
the aggregate profit from the deal that would be precluded by the existence of a
public minority interest.
34. Weinberger also installed more effective protections for stockholders, re-
quiring arms-length negotiations in parent-subsidiary mergers. Since that time,
Delaware has been quite vigilant about stockholder rights. Although defendants
win most of the time, plaintiffs prevail in many cases.
35. Although there has been much debate about whether corporate law really
matters in the sense that parties are largely free to negotiate around most rules, it
seems clear that cases such as Weinberger that announce new rules of global applica-
tion make a difference. See generally Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990) (developing "trivi-
ality hypothesis," which argues that state corporate law "does not prevent compa-
nies-managers and investors together-from establishing any set of governance
rules they want").
36. See Martin Lipton, Greenmail, Bust-Up Takeovers-A Discussion Memorandum,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1984, at 1, 2 (discussing protective shield against "greenmail, bust-
ups and front-end loaded bootstrap takeovers").
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The result was the invention of the poison pill and the passage of an
array of state takeover statutes. The Delaware Supreme Court approved
the pill in 1985. 3 7 And the United States Supreme Court approved state
takeover statutes in 1987, rejecting the argument that they were an undue
burden on interstate commerce or impermissibly inconsistent with federal
tender offer law.38 But none of this would change investor demand for
focused companies that seek to maximize returns. That genie was out of
the bottle. Moreover, the evolution of investor tastes changed the rules
for all companies-not just conglomerates.
The preference of the market for focused companies has profound
implications for the CEO. It is relatively comfortable to run a conglomer-
ate and generate an adequate return for stockholders. 39 So in the 1950s
and 1960s, the CEO was happy to get a nice salary and a bonus. But it is
not so comfortable to assume the risk of generating an ever-increasing
stock price. Diversified stockholders do not really care if a few companies
go broke trying to maximize stockholder value because other companies
will do even better than expected and make up the difference. So it is no
surprise that turnover among CEOs increased dramatically in the 1990s.4 0
Nor is it surprising that CEO pay began to increase dramatically and to
take the form of equity.
4 1
The problem is how to motivate managers to take more risk and even
to break up their own companies when necessary. But why would a CEO
37. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351-53 (Del. 1985)
(examining and approving preferred share purchase rights plan).
38. SeeCTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (find-
ing that Indiana Act did not conflict with Williams Act and any effect on interstate
commerce "is justified by the State's interests in defining the attributes of shares in
its corporations and in protecting shareholders"); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (invalidating Illinois Act under Commerce Clause).
39. Indeed, many economists in the 1950s and 1960s had rejected the idea
that individuals were motivated to maximize wealth in favor of the idea that most
individuals merely sought adequate wealth, an idea that came to be known as satis-
ficing. See Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral
Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 262-65 (1959) (exploring behavior and goals of
business firms).
40. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been,
How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, ECGI Working Paper
No. 44/2004, at 32-34 (exploring trends in CEO demographics); see alsoJohn C.
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implemen-
tation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1554 (2006) (noting that CEO turnover increases
dramatically if securities fraud action is filed against company).
41. SeeJensen & Murphy, supra note 40, at 23-34 (examining trends in execu-
tive remuneration). Although many commentators argue that the growth in
golden parachutes and equity compensation is attributable to changes in the tax
code in 1984 and 1993, respectively (each of which were intended to set limits on
their respective subjects, but both of which came to be viewed as safe harbors), it is
equally plausible to view these events as catalysts that changed the focus of com-
pensation committees, which then began to focus on the other advantages of such
devices.
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want to bust up (or leverage up) his own company? It might be necessary
to avoid takeover, but how could it be rewarding?
The question may sound rhetorical, but it is not. How could we make
it rewarding for a CEO to bust up his own company? The answer is equity
compensation-stock and stock options. Suppose that Acme Fireworks
announces that it will spin off its struggling gopher ball division. The mar-
ket price of Acme skyrockets because each stockholder will now have two
stocks instead of one. You can keep both, or sell one but not the other.
You have exactly what you had before, but now you also have a choice. As
Martha Stewart would say, that is a good thing. Choice alone must be
worth something. Moreover, the new and focused gopher ball company is
likely to do better. It might even become the target of an acquisition.
Although Acme will soon be a smaller company, the price of its stock is
higher. So the CEO will make money on his options even though he has
shrunk the company. If it makes sense for a company to grow by acquiring
other companies, presumably the market will reward that strategy too. In
other words, options work whether a company is growing or shrinking.
Pretty nifty.
But wait. There's more. Options have another important side bene-
fit: they induce companies to repurchase their own shares in order to con-
trol for the dilution that comes from the exercise of options. For
example, in 1997 it was reported that Microsoft used cash equal to two-
thirds of its earnings to repurchase shares.4 2 The news was shocking to
many stockholder activists who saw it as more evidence of insider avarice.
But buybacks fix one of the basic problems that lead to takeovers-the
practice of hoarding cash and reinvesting it in uneconomic expansion. As
one commentator put it, "... [I]dle cash is the devil's workshop. '43 To be
sure, dividend rates remain low today. But that is an illusion. The fact is
that corporations distribute much more cash to stockholders these days.44
And they do so by repurchasing shares from the least happy stockholders,
which further supports stock price. Thus, companies that use options
have evolved into something like open-end mutual funds.
This is not to say that someone sat down and thought this through
quite as I have explained it here. Options have been around for a long
42. See Roger Lowenstein, Microsoft and Its Two Constituencies, WALL ST. J., Dec.
4, 1997, at Cl (noting that huge portion of Microsoft's earnings were "consumed
in the selling-cheap-buying-dear stock-option treadmill").
43. Jason Zweig, With Buybacks, Look Before You Leap, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30-31,
2008, at B1:1.
44. See Harry DeAngelo et al., Are Dividends Disappearing? Dividend Concentra-
tion and the Consolidation of Earnings, 72J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2004), available at http://
marshallinside.usc.edu/deangelo/Publications/DivConcFinal.pdf (documenting
increase in aggregate real dividends paid between 1978 and 2000); Eugene F.
Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or
Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2001) (examining decline in firms'
propensity to pay dividends from 1978 to 1999).
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time. 4 5 Their expanded use may have been prompted by the advent of
the golden parachute in the 1980s.46 But it is enough that options hap-
pen to work.
So it is not at all surprising that equity compensation exploded during
the 1990s and that successful CEOs took home big bucks. 47 In the 1990s,
the CEO assumed the risk of failure in an effort to maximize stockholder
value. And failure meant takeover or the sack. No one who understands
the situation would take such a job without the promise of a big reward.
And if the goal is to generate gain for the stockholders, who would not
insist on a piece of the action? I am not sure why this seems shocking or
wrong to so many corporate activists. It may be that it is undiversified
investors who show up at the annual meeting to collect the box lunch. But
there is long tradition in the business world of working for a piece of the
pie. Nowhere is that more standard than in law firms where an associate
may work ten years for a partnership-though the compensation in the
meantime can be pretty attractive. Why should we assume that the CEO of
a public company must be a hired gun who works for the stockholders in
exchange for a fixed fee? Why would we even want that arrangement? It
makes more sense to think of the CEO as a partner in the business-one
who stands to share the gain, if any.
4 8
45. See Kerbs v. California E. Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. 1952) (per-
mitting stock option plans, provided that certain conditions are met).
46. The essential idea behind the golden parachute is that it will make the
CEO indifferent to takeover. See Richard A. Booth, Is There Any Valid Reason Why
Target Managers Oppose Tender Offers?, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 43, 60 (1986) (noting, how-
ever, that "golden parachute could be so attractive that management would be en-
couraged to sell out too quickly"); Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy:
Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CoRP. FIN. J. 6 (1986), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=173452 (analyzing controversy surrounding takeovers and dis-
cussing use of golden parachutes); see alsoJensen & Murphy, supra note 39, at 27-29
(discussing evolution of golden parachute).
47. SeeJensen & Murphy, supra note 40, at 23-43 (exploring history of execu-
tive remuneration and option explosion). The total amount of officer compensa-
tion as a percentage of corporate income has remained quite constant since 1960.
Jensen and Murphy argue that this fact indicates that compensation committees
have mindlessly stuck with the same formulas in granting options even though
growth in the value of the stock market generally has had the effect of dramatically
increasing the dollar value of compensation. But the evidence is also consistent
with the idea that executive compensation is more about dividing up the corporate
pie between outside stockholders and officer-stockholders. See Richard A. Booth,
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-Manager, U. ILL. L. REv.
269, 296 (2005) (suggesting that corporation should be thought of "as a partner-
ship between management and investors"). On the other hand, it may also be that
the CEO commands a larger percentage of total officer compensation than was the
case in the 1960s and 1970s. It is not clear that the jackpot model of compensation
is a good thing. But that is largely an intramural matter that concerns the officers
as a group.
48. Some commentators have argued that options have been overused to
compensate lower level employees and that they should be reserved for those of-
ficers who can make a difference to stock price. SeeJensen & Murphy, supra note
40, at 35-43 (discussing option component of pay package). That argument ig-
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VI. THE 1960s
I have not said much about the sixties. But as they say, if you remem-
ber the 1960s, you weren't there.
V. CONCLUSION
So what does it all mean? One answer is that our system of corporate
governance (and incentive structures) is in much better shape than seems
to be widely thought. I do not mean to suggest (as did Pangloss in
Voltaire's Candide) that we live in the best of all possible worlds. There is
work to be done. For one thing, it is vital that we monitor executive com-
pensation practices to assure that everyone plays by the rules. Timing and
backdating in the grant of options are serious breaches of faith.
Yet another serious problem is that many investors remain undiversi-
fled-particularly those whose retirement plans are heavily invested in the
shares of their own employer. By far the biggest losers in the collapse of
Enron were the employees who saw their retirement accounts skyrocket
and then vaporize because they were concentrated in Enron stock. If old-
fashioned pensions are going to be replaced by portable accounts, we
need to do better by employee-investors.
In addition, we need to rethink our model of who owns a corpora-
tion. The old idea that the stockholders own the company and that the
CEO is a glorified employee is much too simplistic. In a world of diversi-
fied investors, it is the undiversified CEO who cares most about the com-
pany and who thinks most like an owner. A diversified investor does not
much care about the fate of an individual company. But we cannot expect
a CEO to think the same way. Nor would we want it so. Thus, the better
view is that corporation law is about allocating returns between insiders
and outsiders. The traditional view is that executive compensation is a
nores other significant benefits both of options and of being publicly held in gen-
eral. Options give lower level employees a sense of ownership and a stake in the
fortunes of the company, whether or not they can do much about stock price.
Some recent legal scholarship has emphasized the corporation as a vehicle for
team production in connection with products requiring inputs that cannot be
withdrawn. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 265-76 (1999) (examining team production anal-
ysis of firm). If that view of the corporation is correct-and I suspect that gener-
ally speaking it is-then it is appropriate to reward lower level employees with a
share of the gain from their efforts. In addition, the use of options to compensate
lower-level employees induces them to focus on stock price as a continuous source
of feedback. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, supra note 30, at 256
(stating that "company receives virtually instant feedback through prices and peri-
odic feedback through analyst reports, concerning its strategy and performance
and that of its competitors, which would not be available to a private company").
To be sure, restricted stock could do the same thing. But restricted stock sends a
mixed message. Options emphasize that for the employee, taking a job is an in-
vestment decision. See Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death - The Role
of Competition and Compensation in Building Silicon Valley, I ENTREP. Bus. L. J. 265,
273-78 (2006) (discussing side-benefits of equity compensation).
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mildly interesting duty of loyalty problem because it involves a structural
conflict of interest. To the contrary, executive compensation is the central
problem of corporation law. This insight gives new meaning to the idea of
the monitoring board of directors. Legal scholars have argued for years
that the board of directors should monitor the CEO. Who could disagree
with that idea anyway? The point that seems to have been lost in the shuf-
fle is that the board should not see itself as an advisory body. It is not the
job of the board to support the CEO. Rather, the job of the board is to
officiate the ongoing competition between outside investors and inside of-
ficers. Indeed, the board of directors as an institution makes little sense
otherwise . 4 9
Similarly, our system of securities regulation appears to be stuck in
the 1960s. Among other things, we continue to rely on private securities
fraud class actions as the primary form of enforcement. 50 Individual re-
covery makes sense if a company makes a fraudulent public offering of
overvalued stock. In such a case, the company should give back the cash.
But it makes no sense in a world of diversified investors for investors to
have a right of action against the company simply because the company
fails to disclose bad news in a timely way to existing investors who hold
stock that is already outstanding. In such a stock-drop action-as opposed
to a fraudulent offering-a diversified investor is equally likely to be a
seller as to be a buyer and thus is equally likely to gain as to lose as a result
of the so-called fraud. Moreover, diversified investors gain nothing from
stock-drop actions. Because the corporation pays, holders effectively reim-
burse buyers and sellers keep their gains. In other words, the system suf-
fers from circularity akin to a game of musical chairs in that stock-drop
actions ultimately do no more than transfer wealth among investors. In-
deed, diversified investors are net losers to the extent of attorney fees and
other costs of litigation. And the issuers who are targets of such actions
see their stock drop in price by more than it otherwise would because the
prospect of litigation gives rise to a feedback effect. When the issuer pays
to settle the case, the payment further reduces the value of the company,
which leads to a further decrease in stock price and a further increase in
the potential for damages. In the end, a target company faces a higher
cost of capital than it would in a world without securities fraud class ac-
tions. And, in some cases, it may face financial ruin. On the other hand,
diversified investors may suffer genuine financial loss when insiders take
advantage of nonpublic information for personal gain or when they dam-
age the reputation of the company by failure to be candid with the market.
49. Cf Jensen & Murphy, supra note 40, at 81 (stating that board must "man-
age the tensions between" capital markets and internal managerial organization).
50. See Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Nov. 30,
2006) at 78-80 (conducting cost-benefit analysis of shareholder litigation, com-
monly known as Paulson Report); Coffee, supra note 40, at 1542 (reporting that
"majority of the total monetary sanctions recently imposed in the United States
were obtained through private, not public, enforcement").
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In such cases, stockholders have a real gripe and should have a remedy.
The simple solution is for the courts to deem stock-drop actions to be
derivative actions rather than direct (class) actions. By recasting stock-
drop actions as derivative actions, the courts could in one stroke eliminate
the glaring market inefficiency of circular recovery, lower the cost of capi-
tal for issuers, emphasize individual responsibility, induce boards of direc-
tors and gatekeepers to become more vigilant and reduce the need for
criminal prosecution.
5 1
The problem with securities fraud class actions is but one example of
a larger problem with federal securities law. The larger problem is that
the SEC, Congress and the federal courts remain focused on the idea that
a reasonable investor is one who reads mind-numbing disclosure docu-
ments, chooses a few good stocks and then diligently participates in the
myth known as corporate democracy. The fact is that a reasonable inves-
tor diversifies his portfolio over many stocks usually by investing in a mu-
tual fund or through a pension plan. Indeed, by diversifying his portfolio,
an investor can eliminate company-specific risk without any sacrifice of
expected return. Indeed, one can safely say that it is irrational for an in-
vestor not to diversify. The iron law of investing is that more risk requires
more return. Moreover, as investors come to understand the value of di-
versification, they will bid up market prices because they take less risk.
That is a good thing for issuers. But it means that undiversified investors
who pick a few good stocks end up overpaying. If some investors diversify,
all investors must diversify. Thus, if federal securities law is meant to pro-
tect reasonable investors, it should focus on the interests of a well-diversi-
fied investor, at least where interests conflict. The upshot is that, generally
speaking, our system of disclosure should be more oriented toward the
wholesale market than the retail market.
52
51. For a fuller exposition, see Richard A. Booth, The Paulson Report Recon-
sidered: How to Fix Securities Litigation by Converting Class Actions into Issuer
Actions, Jan. 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084040.
52. The growth of mutual funds and other institutional investors and the mi-
gration of investors to such investments also led to a decline in stock picking.
While growing acceptance of the efficient market theory no doubt led many inves-
tors to eschew stock picking on the theory that you cannot beat the market consist-
ently, it also stands to reason that as investors become more diversified, they have
less reason to engage in stock picking based on detailed company-specific re-
search. This raises important regulatory questions. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal
E. Galpin, The Global Rise of the Value-Weighted Portfolio, AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings
Paper 2 (Mar. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627 (examining
"how the investment community has accepted one of the fundamental insights of
modem portfolio theory-diversification"); see also Martijn Cremers & Jianping
Mei, Turning Over Turnover, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 03-26, AFA 2005 Philadel-
phia Meetings 23 (Nov. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=452720 (find-
ing that roughly three-quarters of trading is motivated other than by stock
picking); Meir Statman et al., Investor Overconfidence and Trading Volume, AFA 2004
San Diego Meetings (Mar. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=168472 (in-
vestigating overconfidence hypothesis and disposition effect). But see Martijn
Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure that
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There remains one very difficult problem for corporation law to ad-
dress: overvalued equity. Stock options have been criticized since the de-
mise of Enron and other major corporations in 2001 as inducing risky
behaviors on the part of corporate executives. 5 3 The standard argument
is that options induce CEOs to take big chances to increase stock price.
Not so. CEOs are poorly diversified and risk averse. The real worry is that
they will take too little risk on behalf of diversified stockholders. Options
are a way of nudging CEOs to take more risk. But they do so only reluc-
tantly, because even with options as the primary form of compensation,
some safe growth is better than taking a big risk for a jackpot.
The real problem arises when stock price increases more than it
should for whatever reason. If stock price is too high, the CEO will natu-
rally seek to keep it from falling in order to maintain paper gains. 54 Look-
ing back on the most recent spate of corporate scandals, it seems clear that
many-if not most-of the problems resulted from an obsession with
meeting analyst expectations: making the quarterly numbers.
So the question is, how do we induce CEOs to decrease stock price
when necessary? Some legal scholars who think that options are the prob-
lem have advocated that corporations use restricted stock as equity com-
pensation.5 5 If anything, that would exacerbate the problem. With
restricted stock, the CEO loses money when stock price falls. With op-
tions, there is no loss other than the lost prospect of gain. That can be
fixed in part by indexing exercise price on the downside. But indexing
addresses the problem of irrational exuberance only when it is market-
wide. It does nothing to address the problem if the market attaches un-
realistic expectations to an individual company. Ironically, the solution
for that problem is to permit and even encourage the board of directors to
re-price options, even though most observers see re-pricing as abusive.
Predicts Performance, AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper (Oct. 3, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891719 (finding that more active managers of non-in-
dex funds outperform less active managers). For a treatment of trading frequency
from a legal point of view, see Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trad-
ing?, 81 VA. L. REv. 713 (1995); see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casi-
nos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REv. 611, 616
(1995) (exploring heterogeneous expectations model which "predicts that inves-
tors' asymmetrical expectations will inspire them to seek short-term profits by spec-
ulating on stocks they perceive as mispriced"); Lynn A. Stout, Reply: Agreeing to
Disagree over Excessive Trading, 81 VA. L. Ru-v. 751, 755 (1995) (arguing that "it
seems unwise (or even irrational) to ground analysis of securities markets solely on
elegant, but often inaccurate, financial models built on the fragile assumptions of
investor homogeneity and agreement"). Bhattacharya and Galpin also found that
in the United States in the 1960s, about sixty percent of trading was motivated by
stock picking. They also predict that the level of stock picking will continue to
decline and stabilize at about eleven percent. See Bhattacharya & Galpin, supra.
53. See, e.g.,Jensen & Murphy, supra note 40, at 44-49 (examining agency costs
of overvalued equity).
54. See id. at 46 (noting that "even those who have sensed the problem have
been unable to stop playing the game").
55. See, e.g., id. at 57-59 (advocating switch to restricted stock).
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The trick is to distinguish those situations in which re-pricing is appropri-
ate from those in which it amounts to a gratuitous do-over. Here again, it
is key to be clear that the board of directors should serve as a monitor for
management, and not as a cheerleading team. If the board of directors
behaves accordingly, the market can be trusted to judge the situation
fairly.
56
I could say more. But I think I have said enough.
56. Cf Richard A. Booth, Stockholders and Stock Options-Malfeasance, Manipu-
lation, Misappropriation or Not? (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
Prior to 2005 (but after 1995), FASB rules required the expensing of re-priced
options, but not of newly granted options. Now that the FASB requires that all
grants be expensed, there is no disincentive in the rules to re-price options, al-
though the market may still react negatively. CompareJensen & Murphy, supra note
40, at 26-27 (describing option re-pricing), zoithJensen & Murphy, supra note 40, at
41-42 (describing disappearance of option re-pricing).
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